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THE “OFFENSIVE” OVERSIMPLIFICATION:
AN ARGUMENT FOR HATE SPEECH LAWS IN THE
MODERN ERA
Mannirmal Kaur Jawa*

In recent years, there has been an influx in the number of
mass shootings committed by white supremacists. In 2019 alone,
white supremacists shot and killed 22 people in El Paso, Texas;
3 people in Gilroy, California; 1 person in Poway, California;
and 51 people in Christchurch, New Zealand.1 As of August
2019, suspects with ties to white supremacy had carried out at
least 17 active-shooter attacks2 around the world in eight years,
killing more than 175 people.3 In 2019, the Department of
Homeland Security said that domestic terrorism, particularly
white supremacist violence, is just as big of a threat as ISIS and
al-Qaeda.4
In response to this violence, some have argued that the
United States, an outlier among other nations with its hate
speech-friendly legal landscape, must begin restricting hate
speech.5 Indeed, several notorious white supremacist shooters in
recent years had found audiences and supporters online before
they committed their crimes, and some even corresponded with

* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2021, University of North Carolina School of Law.
1
Lois Beckett, More than 175 killed worldwide in last eight years in white nationalist-linked
attacks, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 4, 2019 3:58 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2019/aug/04/mass-shootings-white-nationalism-linked-attacks-worldwide;
Weiyi Cai et al., White Extremist Ideology Drives Many Deadly Shootings, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/04/us/whiteextremist-active-shooter.html.
2
Cai, supra note 1.
3
Beckett, supra note 1.
4
Ellen Nakashima, DHS: Domestic terrorism, particularly white-supremacist violence, as big
a threat as ISIS, al-Qaeda, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2019 3:06 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/domestic-terror--particularlywhite-supremacist-violence--as-big-a-threat-as-isis-al-qaeda-dhssays/2019/09/20/dff8aa4e-dbad-11e9-bfb1-849887369476_story.html.
5
See, e.g., Richard Stengel, Why America needs a hate speech law, WASH. POST (Oct. 29,
2019 8:20 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/10/29/whyamerica-needs-hate-speech-law/.
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each other directly.6 On websites like 8chan,7 violent white
supremacists freely circulate racist conspiracy theories like the
Great Replacement Theory, which warns of the erasure of white
people by people of color.8 The shooters that used these websites
went on to cite these falsities in their manifestos.9 Acts of mass
violence have led to policy changes in the United States in the
past.10 The National Firearms Act of 1934, The Gun Control Act
of 1968, and the NICS Improvement Amendments Act were
laws passed in response to acts of violence: the St. Valentine's
Day Massacre, the assassinations of President Kennedy and
Martin Luther King Jr., and the Virginia Tech shooting,
respectively.11
Others argue that restrictions on hate speech would
violate the First Amendment.12 Although the First Amendment
generally bars speech restrictions, there are exceptions to the
rule.13 Obscenity, defamation, fraud, and child pornography are
all considered unprotected speech by the Supreme Court, and the
government does not have to show as much as it would

6

Weiyi Cai & Simone Landon, Attacks by White Extremists Are Growing. So Are Their
Connections., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/03/world/white-extremistterrorism-christchurch.html.
7
See, e.g., Gianluca Mezzofiore & Paul P. Murphy, The New Zealand mosques attack
appeared to inspire California synagogue suspect, CNN (Apr. 30, 2019, 8:44 AM),
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/29/us/california-synagogue-8chan-new-zealandmosque/index.html.
8
Rick Noack, Christchurch endures as extremist touchstone, as investigators probe suspected
El Paso manifesto, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/08/06/christchurch-enduresextremist-touchstone-investigators-probe-suspected-el-paso-manifesto/.
9
Arsalan Iftikhar, Christchurch Anniversary: the Islamophobic ‘Great Replacement Theory,’
BRIDGE A GEO. U. INITIATIVE (Mar. 14, 2020),
https://bridge.georgetown.edu/research/christchurch-anniversary-the-islamophobicgreat-replacement-theory/.
10
See Linda Qiu & Justin Bank, Major Shootings Led to Tougher Gun Laws, but to What
End?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/23/us/politics/fact-check-mass-shootings-gunlaws.html.
11
Id.
12
See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, Bad Arguments for Limiting Speech, THE ATLANTIC
(Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/10/argumentslimiting-speech/601066.
13
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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otherwise need to justify restrictions of unprotected speech.14
Hate speech, however, is considered protected speech.15
When assessing the constitutionality of speech
restrictions, the Court often balances the interests in protecting
First Amendment rights and the interests in regulating the speech
at issue.16 For example, the Court has found that defamation,
obscenity, and other categories of speech “can be
constitutionally proscribed because the social interest in order
and morality outweighs the negligible contribution of those
categories of speech to the marketplace of ideas.”17 How the
Court characterizes the competing interests, then, is critical to
their ultimate holdings in these cases.
There is a common theme among the cases in which the
Court has refused to allow restrictions on hate speech. Whenever
the Court voids a hate speech restriction law, it minimizes the
interests at stake that justify the restriction. Instead of
acknowledging the history behind certain expressions of hate,
their harmful effects on their targeted audiences, and their ability
to spur violence, the Court often characterizes the harm as
simply and vaguely causing offense, which, it says, is not
sufficient to justify restriction.18 It is unclear why the Court
discusses the complexities and degrees of harm caused by
defamation, fraud, obscenity, and child pornography, only to
stop short of any nuanced conversation of the harms of hate
speech. In light of increasing hate speech on the Internet and its
links to acts of white supremacist violence, the Supreme Court
must begin considering the actual harms of hate speech.
I will begin this analysis by exploring available definitions
of hate speech and defining hate speech for the purposes of this
Note. I will then illustrate the critical role that hate speech plays
in acts of white supremacist violence in the twenty-first century.
Next, I will explore how the Court has characterized the interests
14

Id. Government restrictions of protected speech must be the least restrictive means
to further a compelling interest. See Sable Commc’ns Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 126 (1989). But a government regulation of unprotected speech must only be
rationally related to legitimate government interest. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 406 (1992) (White, J., concurring).
15
See, e.g., Village of Skokie v. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Ill.
1978) (holding that a swastika is not prohibited speech). Skokie and other hate speech
cases are discussed further in Part III.
16
See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72.
17
Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 188 (2007).
18
See discussion infra Part III.
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in favor of regulating hate speech in the past. I will argue this
characterization does not consider the violent ends that are
furthered by hate speech, although this violence is what makes
the need for hate speech regulations so pressing.
I. WHAT IS HATE SPEECH?
Because there are no federal hate speech laws in the
United States, there is no legally recognized definition of hate
speech. However, some scholars have attempted to formulate
definitions.19 In his popular article “Words That Wound,”
Richard Delgado argues that racist speech should be proscribed
and crafts a tort action for racist speech.20 To succeed on this tort
action, Delgado proposes plaintiffs would have to show (1) the
defendant addressed them with language that was intended to
demean through reference to race, (2) the plaintiff understood the
language as intending to demean through reference to race, and
(3) a reasonable person would recognize the language as a racial
insult.21 In “The Content and Context of Hate Speech,” Bhikhu
Parekh also proposed a three-part definition of hate speech: (1)
“it is directed against a specified or easily identifiable individual
or, more commonly, a group of individuals based on an arbitrary
or normatively irrelevant feature;” (2) the speech “stigmatizes
the target group by implicitly or explicitly ascribing to it qualities
widely regarded as undesirable;” and (3) “because of its negative
qualities, the target group is viewed as an undesirable presence
and a legitimate object of hostility.”22
The international community also provides examples of
hate speech definitions.23 Article 20 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a multilateral
U.N. treaty, holds state parties to the provision that “[a]ny
19

See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 179 (1992); see also Andrew F.
Sellars, Defining Hate Speech, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. Publication No. 2016-20, 15–18,
(2016), https://cyber.harvard.edu/publications/2016/DefiningHateSpeech (citing
Bhikhu Parekh, Is There a Case for Banning Hate Speech?, in THE CONTENT AND
CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH 37, 40–41 (Michael Herz & Peter Molnar eds., 2012))
[hereinafter Is There a Case for Banning Hate Speech?].
20
Delgado, supra note 19, at 167.
21
Id. at 179.
22
Sellars, supra note 19, at 18 (citing Is There a Case for Banning Hate Speech?, supra
note 19, at 40–41).
23
See infra notes 24–30 and accompanying text.
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advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be
prohibited by law.”24 The Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights interprets this clause as “an
obligation on State Parties to prohibit hate speech.”25
In Canada, it is unlawful to communicate statements in a
public place which incite hatred against an identifiable group and
where it is likely to lead to a breach of the peace.26 It is also an
offense to willfully promote hatred against any identifiable group
when making statements (other than in private conversation).27
In Denmark, “[a]ny person who, publicly or with the intention
of wider dissemination, makes a statement or imparts other
information by which a group of people are threatened, insulted
or degraded on account of their race, colour, national or ethnic
origin, religion, or sexual inclination” is in violation of the law.28
In Germany, it is unlawful to, in a manner that is likely to disturb
public peace, incite hatred, violence, or arbitrary measures
against a national, racial, religious, or ethnic group, against parts
of the population, or against an individual because of their
belonging to a specified group or part of the population.29 It is
also unlawful to violate the human dignity of others by insulting,
maliciously maligning, or defaming a specified group, parts of
the population, or an individual because of his belonging to a
specified group or part of the population.30
This Note broadly discusses how hate speech leads to acts
of violence and argues that this link is a sufficient justification for
some regulation of hate speech. The appropriate language of that
regulation, including its definition of hate speech, would require
further analysis that is beyond the scope of the discussion
presented here. Additionally, this Note requires a broad
definition of hate speech because the various Supreme Court
cases discussed here address laws drafted by different U.S. states,
24

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
14668.
25
Barbora Bukovska, Agnes Callamard & Sejal Parrmer, Towards an interpretation of
article 20 of the ICCPR: Thresholds for the prohibition of incitement to hatred 3 (2010),
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/articles1920_iccpr/docs/CRP7Ca
llamard.pdf.
26
Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, 319(1).
27
Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, 319(2).
28
Straffeloven § 266b.
29
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code], § 130(1), translation at https://www.gesetzeim-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html (Ger.).
30
Id.
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each with their own definition of the proscribed speech. For these
reasons, hate speech, for the purposes of this Note, should be
understood as speech made publicly that willfully promotes
hatred against a marginalized group.

II. WHY REGULATE HATE SPEECH?
Given the history and nature of racist violence in the
United States, our society has always had a significant interest in
regulating hate speech, regardless of whether or not we have
acted on this interest. However, an increase in white supremacist
violence that is traceable, directly and indirectly, to online hate
speech, makes this interest even more weighty, and more difficult
for the Court to ignore.
The causal relationship between hate speech and white
supremacist violence is evidenced through two trends: direct
correlations between hate speech and hate crimes, and the
actions of perpetrators leading up to their acts.
A. The Correlation Between Hate Speech and Hate Crimes
Correlations alone do not imply causal relationships.
However, strong evidence of a correlation is worthy of attention,
and it exists between hate speech and hate crimes. When hate
speech increases, hate crimes do too.31
One of the most recent examples of this correlation is the
2016 United States presidential campaign, which brought with it
some of the most frequent use of Islamophobic rhetoric by public
figures in recent years.32 Throughout Donald Trump’s campaign
in 2015, he regularly dehumanized and incited violence against
Muslims.33 In September of 2015, Trump said of Syrian refugees,
“They could be ISIS, I don’t know. This could be one of the great
tactical ploys of all time. A 200,000-man army, maybe.”34 In
31

See infra notes 32–43 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 33–38 and accompanying text.
33
See infra notes 34–38 and accompanying text.
34
Jenna Johnson & Abigail Hauslohner, ‘I think Islam hates us’: A timeline of Trump’s
comments about Islam and Muslims, WASH. POST (May 20, 2017),
32
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November, he said that he would “strongly consider” closing
mosques in the United States and twice falsely claimed that he
watched thousands of people in New Jersey, who he implied
were Arab, cheer as the World Trade Center collapsed.35 In
December, he said, “If you have people coming out of mosques
with hatred and death in their eyes and on their minds, we’re
going to have to do something.”36 Later that month, Trump
announced his proposed Muslim Ban policy and said that
Muslims are “sick people.”37 He also said that large segments of
Muslims in the United States hate America, citing a widely
disproven poll by an Islamophobic organization.38 His extreme
rhetoric coincided with a tremendous surge in anti-Muslim
violent crimes: In November 2016, there were thirty-five
documented anti-Muslim incidents, and in December there were
fifty-three attacks.39 Anecdotally, as a Sikh American myself, I
distinctly remember my own heightened fear for my safety and
that of my loved ones that November and December. While the
uptick in hate crimes during that period may also have been
attributable to the San Bernardino and Paris terror attacks that
occurred at that time, anti-Muslim hate crimes increased by
sixty-seven percent in 2015 compared to 2014, the highest surge
seen since 9/11.40 That Trump’s rhetoric caused more hate
crimes by emboldening perpetrators is further supported by
research that shows that Trump’s election was associated with a
statistically significant surge in reported hate crimes nationally,
even when controlling for other potential explanations.41
While Trump’s candidacy is one of the most convincing
examples of a strong correlation relationship between hate
speech and hate crimes in recent years, it is not the only example
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/05/20/i-thinkislam-hates-us-a-timeline-of-trumps-comments-about-islam-and-muslims/.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Engy Abdelkader, When Islamophobia Turns Violent: The 2016 U.S. Presidential
Elections, THE BRIDGE INITIATIVE GEO. U. 36 (2016).
40
Mazin Sidahmed, FBI reports hate crimes against Muslims surged by 67% in 2015, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/nov/14/fbi-anti-muslim-hate-crimes-rise-2015.
41
Griffin Sims Edwards & Stephen Rushin, The Effect of President Trump's Election on
Hate Crimes (Jan. 14, 2018), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3102652;
Ayal Feinberg et al., Counties that hosted a 2016 Trump rally saw a 226 percent increase in
hate crimes, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2019, 7:45 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/22/trumps-rhetoric-doesinspire-more-hate-crimes/.

2020] THE “OFFENSIVE” OVERSIMPLIFICATIO N

137

of this relationship. One study found a correlation between the
number of racist tweets and the amount of racist hate crimes in
100 U.S. cities.42 This correlation is not unique to the United
States. For example, according to the Council on Foreign
Relations, there is research that shows a correlation between
anti-refugee Facebook posts by a far-right political party and
attacks on refugees in Germany.43 These studies further
demonstrate that hate speech often prefigures violence.
B. The Actions of Perpetrators Leading Up to Their Acts
There is perhaps no stronger evidence of the direct
relationship between hate speech, specifically hate speech on the
Internet, and white supremacist violence, than the actions of
several recent white supremacist shooters leading up to their acts
of violence.
One of the most infamous examples of this trend was the
Charleston church shooting in 2015. On a June evening, Dylann
Roof walked into Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church
in Charleston, South Carolina.44 After participating in a bible
study with churchgoers, he pulled out a gun and opened fire on
them, killing nine people.45 He explained his motivation to one
of the churchgoers who tried to stop him: “I have to do it. You
rape our women and you’re taking over our country. And you
have to go.”46
In his manifesto, Roof explained how influential the
Internet was to his radicalization: “I was not raised in a racist

42

Kunal Relia et al., Race, Ethnicity and National Origin-based Discrimination in Social
Media and Hate Crimes Across 100 U.S. Cities, N.Y. UNIV. 8–9 (2019),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.00119.pdf.
43
Zachary Laub, Hate Speech on Social Media: Global Comparisons, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELS. (June 7, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hate-speechsocial-media-global-comparisons.
44
Marco della Cava, 5 Years after Charleston was Rocked by the Mother Emanuel Church
Shooting, the Pain Lingers, USA TODAY (June 17, 2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/06/16/charleston-churchshooting-mother-emanuel-five-years/3193054001/.
45
Id.
46
Church Gunman Reportedly Said: ‘I have to do it,’ NBC NEWS (June 18, 2015),
https://www.nbcnews.com/video/church-gunman-reportedly-said-i-have-to-do-it467402819802.
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home or environment,”47 he wrote. According to Roof, the
murder of Trayvon Martin, a Black child, by George
Zimmerman, a white man, sent him on an Internet expedition
that radicalized him:
It was obvious that Zimmerman was in the right .
. . this prompted me to type in the words ‘black on
White crime’ into Google, and I have never been
the same since that day. The first website I came
to was the Council of Conservative Citizens.
There were pages upon pages of these brutal black
on White murders.”48
The Council of Conservative Citizens is a white
supremacist group,49 and its website is still online. The home
page features headlines that cast current events in a white
supremacist light, such as “The FBI and Jewish Organizations
Invent Anti-White Coronavirus Conspiracy Theory,”50 and
“Italian Virologist Says Concerns Over ‘Racism’ Crippled Italy’s
Coronavirus Response.”51 There is also a section on the website
called the Memorial Wall, which purports to list examples of
murders by people of color, noting when the people killed were

47

Rebecca Hersher, What Happened When Dylann Roof Asked Google For Information
About Race?, NPR (Jan. 10, 2017, 2:23 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/01/10/508363607/what-happened-when-dylann-roof-asked-google-forinformation-about-race. Contrary to Roof’s statement on his upbringing, he was
likely raised around some manifestation of racism, whether he knew it or not. All of
us are. This statement is not included here to suggest that it is in fact true that Roof
was not raised around racism, but to help demonstrate Roof’s own insistence that his
Internet search was one of the defining moments that lead to his horrific acts.
48
Id.
49
David A. Graham, The White-Supremacist Group That Inspired a Racist Manifesto,
THE ATLANTIC (June 22, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/council-of-conservativecitizens-dylann-roof/396467/.
50
Eric Striker, The FBI and Jewish Organizations Invent Anti-White Coronavirus
Conspiracy Theory, CONSERVATIVE HEADLINES (Apr. 5, 2020), https://conservativeheadlines.org/the-fbi-and-jewish-organizations-invent-anti-white-coronavirusconspiracy-theory/.
51
Paul Joseph Watson, Italian Virologist Says Concerns Over “Racism” Crippled Italy’s
Coronavirus Response, CONSERVATIVE HEADLINES (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://conservative-headlines.org/italian-virologist-says-concerns-over-racismcrippled-italys-coronavirus-response/ (originally published on SUMMIT NEWS,
https://summit.news/2020/03/20/italian-virologist-says-concerns-over-racismcrippled-italys-coronavirus-response/).
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white.52 Dylann Roof seemed to refer specifically to this section
of the website in his manifesto.53
Federal prosecutors said that Roof self-radicalized
online.54 According to anti-hate organizations, Roof is not
alone.55 In a report on hate and extremism published in 2016, the
Southern Poverty Law Center said that:
White supremacists are increasingly opting to
operate mainly online, where the danger of public
exposure and embarrassment is far lower, where
younger people tend to gather, and where it
requires virtually no effort or cost to join in the
conversation . . . . The milieu of the web is an ideal
one for “lone wolves”—terrorists who operate on
their own and are radicalized online.56
Adam Neufeld of the Anti-Defamation League told the
Washington Post “I think that the white-supremacist movement
has used technology in a way that has been unbelievably effective
at radicalizing people.”57 Shannon Martinez of the Free Radicals
Project, a former white supremacist, said “[t]here’s a lot of
romanticization of violence among the far-right online, and there
aren’t consequences to that.”58
As another example, in August 5, 2012, Michael Page
entered a gurdwara, or Sikh place of worship, in Wisconsin and
opened fire, killing seven worshipers.59 Before the shooting, Page

52

Memorial Wall 2017, CONSERVATIVE HEADLINES, https://conservativeheadlines.org/memorial-wall-2017/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2020).
53
Hersher, supra note 47.
54
Mark Berman, Prosecutors say Dylann Roof ‘self-radicalized’ online, wrote another
manifesto in jail, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/08/22/prosecutorssay-accused-charleston-church-gunman-self-radicalized-online/.
55
See infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
56
MARK POTOK, THE YEAR IN HATE AND EXTREMISM (2016),
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2016/year-hate-andextremism.
57
Rachel Hatzipanagos, How Online Hate Turns into Real-Life Violence, WASH. POST
(Nov. 30, 2018, 2:31 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/11/30/how-online-hate-speech-isfueling-real-life-violence/.
58
Id.
59
Jordan Mickle, Sikh Priest Who was Left Partially Paralyzed after 2012 Sikh Temple
Shooting in Oak Creek has Died, WTMJ-TV MILWAUKEE (Mar. 2, 2020, 8:51 PM),
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had found community among fellow white supremacists
online.60 He used the Internet to promote his white supremacist
musical groups and interact with other white supremacists.61
A 2019 analysis by the New York Times further illustrates
the role of the Internet in modern hate crime trends by
consolidating the connections among recent white supremacist
perpetrators.62 For example, the shooter who killed fifty-one
Muslims in a mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand in 2019
claimed to have been inspired by an attacker in Norway who
killed seventy-seven people in 2011.63 The Christchurch shooter
had also corresponded directly with Dylann Roof and with
another perpetrator who killed nine people.64 The Times writes
that these international connections “highlight how the
[I]nternet and social media have facilitated the spread of white
extremist ideology and violence.”65
Finally, according to the Council on Foreign Relations,
hate speech on social media has inspired violence in other parts
of the world.66 In India, acts of communal violence have been
traced to rumors originating on the Internet messaging app
Whatsapp.67 In Myanmar, military leaders and Buddhist
nationalists demonized Rohingya Muslims on social media
before and during a campaign of ethnic cleansing.68 In Sri Lanka,
the government blocked access to Facebook, Whatsapp, and the
messaging app Viber, after rumors online inspired violence
against the Tamil Muslim minority community.69
The Internet has become a refuge for white supremacists,
including the perpetrators of some of the most deadly acts of
https://www.tmj4.com/news/local-news/sikh-priest-who-was-left-partiallyparalyzed-after-2012-sikh-temple-shooting-in-oak-creek-has-died.
60
See Michael Laris et al., Excessive Drinking Cost Wade Michael Page Military Career,
Civilian Job, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2012)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/excessive-drinking-costwade-michael-page-military-career-civilian-job/2012/08/07/274ccc7a-e095-11e1a421-8bf0f0e5aa11_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_6.
61
Id.
62
Cai & Landon, supra note 6.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Laub, supra note 43.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
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racist violence in recent years.70 Their racist views might isolate
them from other parts of society, but they are able to find,
support, and radicalize each other online. By providing white
supremacists with communities of like-minded individuals and a
platform to espouse hate speech, the Internet has become
instrumental to white supremacist violence in the twenty-first
century. The kind of speech that our allies have regulated71
circulates freely on websites in the United States, and people of
color continue to pay the price for it with their lives.
III. HATE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
In Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire,72 the Supreme
Court articulated several categories of speech that are not
protected under the First Amendment: “the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words.”73
These words are unprotected, the Court held, because they play
“no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.” 74
The Supreme Court’s general rule is that governmental
bodies may not proscribe the form or content of individual
expression.75 According to the Court, “most situations where the
State has a justifiable interest in regulating speech will fall within
one or more of the various established exceptions . . . .”76
Under the Chaplinsky framework, there was a brief
moment in history during which the Supreme Court was
protective of hate speech regulations.77 In 1952, the Court upheld
an Illinois statute that regulated hate speech in Beauharnais v.
Illinois,78 finding that hate speech is group libel, and thus can be
proscribed under the constitution.79 The Illinois statute in
question declared the following:
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It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or
corporation to manufacture, sell, or offer for sale,
advertise or publish, present or exhibit in any
public place in this state any lithograph, moving
picture, play, drama or sketch, which publication
or exhibition portrays depravity, criminality,
unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens,
of any race, color, creed or religion which said
publication or exhibition exposes the citizens of
any race, color, creed or religion to contempt,
derision, or obloquy or which is productive of
breach of the peace or riots.80
The case arose after Beauharnais exhibited leaflets in
public places in Chicago that included a membership application
for the White Circle League of America, Inc. and a petition.81 It
called on local government “to halt the further encroachment,
harassment and invasion of white people, their property,
neighborhoods and persons,” and called for “[o]ne million selfrespecting white people in Chicago to unite.”82 It also said that
“[i]f persuasion and the need to prevent the white race from
becoming mongrelized by the [omitted] will not unite us, then
the aggressions, rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of
the [omitted], surely will.”83 In holding that the Illinois law and
the conviction under it did not violate the First Amendment, the
Court categorized the type of speech punished by the law as
group libel.84 Libel is unprotected speech under Chaplinsky.85
In coming to its conclusion, the Court engaged in a
lengthy discussion of the harms of hate speech.86 Two pages of
the Court’s opinion are dedicated to a discussion of Illinois’
history of racist violence, the impact hate speech has on its
audience, and the tangible ways it affects its victims.87 The Court
cited the murder of abolitionist Lovejoy, a riot that resulted from
the arrival of immigrants and Black migrants, and other acts of
80
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racist violence in Illinois.88 Further, the Court highlighted acts of
racist violence that occurred just prior to the passage of the hate
speech restriction in question.89 According to the Court, it was
reasonable to believe that hate speech might have contributed to
these acts of violence: “In many of these outbreaks, utterances of
the character here in question, so the Illinois legislature could
conclude, played a significant part.”90
In addition to acknowledging the potential ways hate
speech had contributed to violence in Illinois, the Court also
noted that the speech prohibited by the Illinois statute was “made
in public places and by means calculated to have a powerful
emotional impact on those to whom it was presented.”91 Finally,
the Court recognized that hate speech can inhibit the rights and
liberties of its victims:
“Long ago this Court recognized that the
economic rights of an individual may depend for
the effectiveness of their enforcement on rights in
the group, even though not formally corporate, to
which he belongs. . . . [t]he Illinois Legislature
may warrantably believe that a man's job and his
educational opportunities and the dignity
accorded him may depend as much on the
reputation of the racial and religious group to
which he willy-nilly belongs, as on his own
merits.”92
In the decades following Beauharnais and into the presentday, Beauharnais “has been de facto overruled.”93 This dramatic
shift is evident in cases like Village of Skokie v. National Socialist
Party of America,94 in which the Supreme Court of Illinois held
that the village of Skokie, Illinois, could not stop the American
Nazi Party from displaying swastikas while marching in
Skokie.95 A majority Skokie of residents were Jewish, 5,000 to
88
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7,000 of whom survived German concentration camps.96 In
addition to wearing swastika armbands and carrying a swastika
banner, the demonstrators planned on carrying signs with
messages including “Free Speech for White America.”97
According to the Court, swastikas did not fall into the
unprotected speech category of fighting words.98 They also were
not sufficiently “offensive and peace threatening to the public”
to be their own category of unprotected speech.99 Thus, they were
afforded protection under the First Amendment.100 The Court
made no reference to Beauharnais in its opinion.101
Among the differences between the Beauharnais and
Skokie opinions is the way the opinions characterized the
regulatory interests involved in restricting hate speech. In
upholding Illinois’ hate speech law, the Beauharnais majority
discussed the history of racist violence in Illinois at length, as
well as how that violence was connected to hate speech.102 The
majority also discussed how hate speech is detrimental to “free,
ordered life in a metropolitan, polyglot community,” and to the
exercise of equal rights and liberties of those whom it targets.103
In Skokie, however, the Court’s discussion of the regulatory
interests at stake was comparatively lacking. There was no
discussion of the history of racism in Illinois or elsewhere.
Additionally, although the case dealt with a free speech issue,
there was no discussion of what the speech at issue—the
swastika—actually meant or symbolized, beyond the fact that it
was part of the German Nazi uniform. Unlike in Beauharnais,
there was no discussion of the ability of the targets of the speech
to exercise their rights and liberties, nor of the effect that the
speech had on the community. In lieu of any such nuanced
discussion, the Court repeatedly characterized the speech at issue
as simply “offensive,”104 with no discussion of what it means to
be offensive, or why the speech at issue might offend.
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The Court dismissed regulatory interests again in R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul.105 There, the Court invalidated a bias-motivated
crime ordinance, describing it as impermissible viewpoint
discrimination,106 with no discussion of the meaning or history
of the speech in question: cross burning. The opinion made no
mention of the Ku Klux Klan (K.K.K.) or of the history of racist
violence associated with cross burning. While we will never
know exactly how many Americans the K.K.K. has killed, we
do know that thousands of people have been killed in lynchings,
either by the K.K.K. or by those who subscribe to the same racist
philosophy of white supremacy that the K.K.K. does.107 The
Court also did not acknowledge Minnesota’s own specific
history of racism, documented in part by 30,000 racially
restrictive property deeds in just one Minnesota County.108 By
barring Black Minnesotans from homeownership, these racist
covenants also deprived them of the stability and wealth-building
opportunities that come with homeownership. This prolific
practice was a contributing cause of Minnesota’s current status
as one of the most racially inequitable states in the country.109
Further, the R.A.V. Court did not discuss the effects that cross
burning has on people of color and their liberties, or the effects
on our society as a whole. Instead, the Court simply found that,
although the speech restricted by the ordinance falls into the
unprotected category of fighting words, the ordinance
nonetheless violated the First Amendment, because it restricted
only certain fighting words, while allowing others.110
Finally, the Supreme Court once again minimized the
regulatory interests at stake in hate speech cases in Virginia v.
Black.111 There, the Court struck down a Virginia law that
prohibited cross burning.112 Unlike in R.A.V., the Black Court
actually did discuss the history of cross burning, the K.K.K., and
the violence associated with that group.113 However, the Court
105
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went on to assert that there are two categories of cross burning:
cross burning with the intent to intimidate, and cross burning
without the intent to intimidate.114 The latter category
encompasses cross burning done as political speech.115
According to the Court, “sometimes the cross burning is a
statement of ideology, a symbol of group solidarity. It is a ritual
used at Klan gatherings, and it is used to represent the Klan
itself.”116 For this reason, the Court said, it is fundamentally
different from cross burning meant to intimidate.117 Once the
Court established that cross burning might be political speech in
instances like this, there was no further discussion of the
regulatory interest. There was no return to the discussion of the
Klan’s history of racist violence and how that history weighs
against cross burning as political speech. The only interest
weighing against political cross burning, according to the Court,
was that it might arouse “a sense of anger or hatred among the
vast majority of citizens who see a burning cross.”118 But the
Court quickly dismissed this interest by citing a quote by Gerald
Gunther, who, despite his childhood experience in Nazi
Germany, believed he must “walk the sometimes difficult path
of denouncing the bigot's hateful ideas with all my power, yet at
the same time challenging any community's attempt to suppress
hateful ideas by force of law.”119 And, thus, by simply citing the
personal opinion of one legal scholar, the Court dismissed the
interests against political cross burning, after already minimizing
those interests as simply the risk that political cross burning
would arouse a sense of anger or hatred.120
Underlying the stark contrast between Beauharnais and
the cases that came after it is a fundamental shift in the way our
judiciary understands and characterizes the interests against hate
speech. In Beauharnais, the Supreme Court displayed an
understanding of the real, tangible harms associated with hate
speech: it is intertwined with violence, it undermines the values
of our communities, and it violates the rights of its targets.121 But
in post-Beauharnais hate speech cases, the Supreme Court has
114
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consistently dismissed the interests associated with hate speech
regulations by generalizing the harms of hate speech as merely
that they cause offense and by ignoring the history of violence
associated with hate speech.122 This minimization is perhaps
most clear when the Court begins and ends its characterization
of the interests at stake as simply “offensive.” The lack of nuance
is glaring here. Black’s Law Dictionary provides two definitions
for “offensive” as used in this context: “[u]npleasant or
disagreeable to the senses; obnoxious[,]” and “[c]ausing
displeasure, anger, or resentment; esp., repugnant to the
prevailing sense of what is decent or moral . . . .”123 Under these
definitions, something can be offensive for many different
reasons. A movie review is offensive to a reader who disagrees
with it. We all encounter expressions that offend us in this way
frequently. However, an order to kill someone–––which is more
severe and likely to cause harm than a movie review–––can also
be characterized as offensive. Similarly, an expression that
denies someone a constitutional right is also both offensive and
significantly harmful. Hate speech is offensive to many, but it
also potentially denies the rights of people of color when it fosters
violence against them. To call something “offensive” then
cannot be the end of a complete discussion of a statement’s
harms. Yet the Court has repeatedly ended the discussion there.
The Court illustrated this point further in Matal v. Tam.124
While the facts of Matal presented a scenario unique compared
to other hate speech cases,125 the Court’s opinion, written by
Justice Alito, once again oversimplified the interests at stake in
hate speech cases generally: “But no matter how the
[Government’s] point is phrased, its unmistakable thrust is this:
The Government has an interest in preventing speech expressing
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ideas that offend. And, as we have explained, that idea strikes at
the heart of the First Amendment.”126
Justice Kennedy also minimized the interests at issue in
his concurring opinion in Matal: “A law that can be directed
against speech found offensive to some portion of the public can
be turned against minority and dissenting views to the detriment
of all.”127 Here, Justice Kennedy minimized the interests at stake
by characterizing the speech as merely offensive, and then
justified protecting so-called offensive speech by asserting that
minority and dissenting views would be silenced if such speech
was unprotected.
Supreme Court Justices are not the only ones who
minimize the interests in regulating hate speech. Nani Jansen
Reventlow, director of the Digital Freedom Fund, argues for
lenient, if any, regulation of harmful speech online.128 Although
she concedes that the Internet should be safe and open for
everyone regardless of race, she writes, “[i]n order to move
forward as a society, we need dissenting voices; even ones that
express their views in a way that may be offensive or shocking to
others, however unpleasant that might be.”129 In addition to
“unpleasant,” Jansen refers to harmful speech on the Internet as
“unpopular” and, of course, “offensive.”130 While it may be true
that harmful speech is all of those things, its harms do not stop
there, and discussions of hate speech regulations should not
either.
In addition to minimizing the interests at stake in hate
speech cases, commentators also overstate the value of hate
speech. In “Bad Arguments for Limiting Speech,” Conor
Friedersdorf argues that, if hate speech can be regulated because
it leads to violence, then feminist speech or “Hollywood movies
that portray two men kissing” that, according to Friedersdorf,
might provoke violence from “Islamist radicals” would also be
subject to potential regulation.131 But just as the harms of hate
126
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speech should not be minimized to the fact that it offends or is
unpopular, the value of hate speech should not be equated to the
value of feminist speech and speech that portrays the LGBTQ
community. When speech is understood to have high value, it is
harder for the interests against it to outweigh the interests for it.
And after one hundred years of slavery, one hundred years of
Jim Crow laws, thousands of lynchings, and pervading social
inequities and mass acts of racist violence that continue today,
we should be able to recognize that the value of hate speech
cannot be equated to the value of feminist and pro-LGBTQ
speech, which have both been integral to movements that
secured rights for women and the LGBTQ community.
IV. THE DISSONANCE
The Court’s First Amendment hate speech jurisprudence
can be summed up as follows: certain types of speech—the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and insulting or fighting
words––are unprotected under the First Amendment.132 These
categories of speech, and only these, are unprotected because the
interest in social order and morality outweighs their contribution
to society, if they have any.133 Hate speech is not one of the
enumerated categories of unprotected speech, so it would have
to fall under one of the enumerated categories to be unprotected.
It does not fall under the category of libel anymore, like it once
did in Beauharnais.134 It is also not considered fighting words, as
established in Skokie.135 Hate speech cannot fall under the
obscene category, because speech must appeal “to the prurient
interest” to be obscene.136 According to the Court’s position that
the enumerated exceptions cover most types of speech that the
government is justified in proscribing, because their threat to
social order and morality outweighs any contribution they might
132
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have, the Court apparently believes that the threat posed to
society by hate speech is not so severe or harmful that it
outweighs its contributions.
If the interest at stake in hate speech cases is merely that
audiences will be offended, as the Court has often said or
implied,137 then perhaps the Court is right: people are offended
every day, and this is hardly a reason to regulate all of the speech
that causes this offense. But to say that the interest against hate
speech is that it is offensive is the logical equivalent of saying that
the interest against arson is that it is distressing. Certainly, arson
can cause distress. It can cause distress because it is unsightly,
but it can also cause distress because it can hurt and kill people.
Similarly, hate speech can offend because a listener disagrees
with it, but it can also offend by providing community and
encouragement to white supremacists, who often go on to hurt
and kill people. If the Supreme Court heard a case about the
regulation of arson, it would almost certainly consider the
potential that arson could hurt people. The Court might cite
statistics of the number of people killed or hurt by arson every
year, the monetary cost of repairs undergone after acts of arson,
and the effects of arson on a peaceful society. The discussion of
arson would not simply be that it is offensive or unpleasant, or
even just that it arouses anger.
Why, then, does the Supreme Court dismiss the interests
against hate speech so hurriedly, with no discussion of the
history of racism in the United States and the ways it has cost us,
in capital and human life? And as white supremacists continue
to flock to the Internet to spread racist lies that inspire acts of
violence, why is there no discussion of the connections between
hate speech and acts of mass violence?
When assessing the Supreme Court’s ability and
willingness to assess the tangible effects of racism on the lives of
people of color, it is difficult to ignore the racial makeup of the
Supreme Court bench. While there is no way to know for sure if
more diversity on the bench would have led to different
outcomes in the Court’s hate speech cases, it is not implausible
that Justices of color might have more easily appreciated the
weighty consequences of hate speech while hearing these cases.
This seemed to be the case in Virginia v. Black, where Justice
137
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Thomas, the only Black person and person of color on the Court,
was the sole dissenter.138 Research shows that Black people
sometimes recognize racism when white people do not.139 White
Americans are also more likely than Black, Hispanic, and Asian
Americans to say that too much attention is paid to race issues
in our country, and non-White people are more likely to say that
discrimination is overlooked.140 Again, there is no way to know
if a more diverse Court would have decided hate speech cases
differently. The racial composition of the Court is simply one
potential explanation for the Court’s discourse on the harms of
hate speech. But entertaining the hypothetical scenario in which
the Court ruled differently in these cases begs one more “what
if?”
What if that Court had followed its precedent set in
Beauharnais? And what if, as a result, other states, and perhaps
the federal government, enacted laws like Illinois’ hate speech
law in Beauharnais?141 If speech that publicly demeans on the
basis of race or religion was in fact regulated in the United States,
as it is in other countries, would Donald Trump still have called
Muslims “sick people” during his campaign?142 If he had
refrained, would the Christchurch shooter, who praised Trump
as a “symbol of renewed white identity and common purpose”
still have killed fifty-one Muslims in their place of worship?143 If
hate propaganda distributed electronically could be confiscated
in the United States, as is the case in Canada,144 would Dylann
Roof have found the propaganda that he said changed him
forever after a Google search?145 If he had not, would he ever
have committed mass murder in the name of white supremacy?
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Of course, this conjecture is futile. Just like it is impossible
to know if the Court would have ruled differently under different
circumstances, it is impossible to know for sure how many lives
might have been saved if they had. But it is not impossible to
change course now and potentially prevent more tragedy. The
Supreme Court has established precedent in Beauharnais that is
as applicable to the present as it ever was:
The danger in these times from the coercive
activities of those who in the delusion of racial or
religious conceit would incite violence and
breaches of the peace in order to deprive others of
their equal right to the exercise of their liberties, is
emphasized by events familiar to all. These and
other transgressions of those limits the states
appropriately may punish.146
While racist violence has always been present in the
United States, the direct connections between hate speech online
and acts of mass violence provide an inescapable justification for
allowing the regulating of hate speech. At the very least, it is time
for the Court to acknowledge racist violence in the context of
hate speech as an interest weighing in favor of regulation.
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